Roger Williams University

DOCS@RWU
Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation
Faculty Publications

Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation

2007

Humanism and Disegno: Neoplatonism at the Accademia di San
Luca in Rome
John S. Hendrix
Roger Williams University, jhendrix@risd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/saahp_fp
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Recommended Citation
Hendrix, J. S. (2007). Humanism and Disegno: Neoplatonism at the Accademia di San Luca in Rome.
Retrieved from https://docs.rwu.edu/saahp_fp/1

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Architecture, Art, and Historic
Preservation at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact
mwu@rwu.edu.

1

Humanism and Disegno:
Neoplatonism at the Accademia di San Luca in Rome
John Hendrix, Rhode Island School of Design
I would like to explore the role that Neoplatonism played in the development of the concept of disegno at the Accademia di San Luca in Rome, and its influence on subsequent
architecture, for the purpose of illustrating the importance of Renaissance Humanism in
the culture of Baroque Rome.
In his treatise, L’Idea de’ pittori, scultori ed architteti, in 1607, Federico Zuccari, the
director of the Academy, described disegno interno as a Platonic Idea in the mind of the
artist, and a forma spirituale which mediates between archê and eidos, between universal
and particular. Disegno interno is a scintilla della divinità, a spark of the fire of the Divine intellect, which is manifest in Nous, or Intellectual Principle, from Plotinus, that part
of Mind which participates in the Divine. Form enters matter through design, and intellect is the instument which molds form. For Zuccari, disegno is a segno di dio in noi, or
sign of God in us, as manifest in intellectus speculativus, or internal contemplation. Universal design becomes particular design as universals are transformed into particulars,
through types, similitudes and metaphors. The spark in Nous creates dream images, phantasms, and imaginations.
Plato, in the Republic, distinguished between imitative representation and cognitive
process. The artist invests form with concept. Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, described the
form of the work of art as pre-existing in the mind of the artist. Plotinus, in the Enneads,
defined form as that which enters matter through intellect. The artist reproduces the principles of nature rather than its appearance. Form or eidos, in both art and nature, is produced by the ordering principles of Mind, or Nous. Marsilio Ficino, in Sopra lo amore, or
Commentary on the Symposium of Plato, in 1444, distinguished between Bellezza, sensible beauty, and the Bello, disegno interno, of which Bellezza is a product. Res extensa,
external form, is a realization of res cogitans, ideas. In Ficino’s Theologia Platonica, design is seen as a mirror to the intellect, reasoned through ‘metaphor and similitude’. This
concept is developed in the transcripts of the Accademia di San Luca in Rome, Origine et
Progresso dell’Academia del Disegno, in 1604, written by Romano Alberti. The distinction between Bello and Bellezza is developed by Pietro da Cortona in his treatise, Trattato
della Pittura e Scultura, in 1652, written with Domenico Ottonelli, using the pseudonyms
Britio Prenetteri and Odomenigico Lelonotti.
Pietro da Cortona played an active role in the Academy, as did Carlo Maderno, and
the influence of the concept of disegno can be seen in particular in the architecture of
Pietro and Francesco Borromini, in works such as Santi Luca e Martina and San Carlo
alle Quattro Fontane, which can be seen as visual and structural representations of the intellect of the artist and the principles of nature. This can be seen in mathematical, geometrical, and metaphorical models of the structure of the cosmos as used by both
architects. Precedents for the role of ‘metaphor and similitude’ in architectural design can
be seen in works such as Michelangelo’s Porta Pia and Giulio Romano’s Palazzo del Tè
in the sixteenth century.
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The Idea
Zuccari expressed in L’Idea de’ pittori, scultori ed architetti, in the Neoplatonic tradition,
that the form of the work of art exists first in the mind of the artist, considering design
universally as the fabrication of every intellectual idea1. Disegno interno is ‘a concept
formed in our mind, that enables us explicitly and clearly to recognize anything, whatever
it may be, and to operate practically in conformance with the thing intended’2. The Idea is
a forma spirituale which is both ‘divised and used by the intellect to apprehend all natural
things clearly and distinctly’3, and the expression of such apprehension in artistic materials; here the Idea is differentiated from the theological Idea as it is applied to artistic production, or artistic representation, which is called disegno esterno, or external design.
Following Plato, disegno esterno is the imitation of an idol, and it is also a metaphor for
disegno interno, the inner ordering principle and Neoplatonic light of the intellect4.
Plato conceived of the idea as being ‘in the world of shapes and figures something
perfect and sublime, to which imagined form those objects not accessible to sensory perception can be related by way of imitation’5, in the words of Cicero in the Orator. For
Plato the Idea, the form of a thing, exists ‘eternally, being contained in our reason and our
intellect: all else is born and dies, remains in a state of flux’. As such Plato distinguished
between imitative representation6, or the ability to render only the sensory appearances of
the material world, and form which is invested with the concept of cognitive truth in the
attainment of a universal and eternal form corresponding to the idea. Such a distinction
would mean a distinction and separation, and also identification, between the aesthetic
and the theoretical, between sensory experience and rational cognition.
Form and concept, image and idea should be combined in the work of art. The work
of art is defined as being invested with scientific and mathematical principles which it
can reveal, as in architecture and music, but can only exist in the realm of images, and not
ideas, and can thus inhibit as much as aid the knowledge of the Idea—the unrepresentable
should not be represented, though form should suggest concept. As the reception of material objects by sensory perception is conceived as a cognitive function, so form should be
invested with cognitive process, but can only be done so by that process. Aristotle distinguishes between form and matter, appearance and idea as well, but he sees them as interacting, in that form enters into matter. In Book VII of Metaphysics, ‘The thing in the
sense of form or substance we do not make, but the so-called compound whole we make;
and in everything that is made matter is present and one part of it is matter and the other
form’7.
Art for Aristotle is a form of the power of thought, and the form of the material product contains the essence, or is the essence, of the form in the idea of the maker. As form
and matter interact, so thought and substance interact in form. The form of a work of art
exists in the mind of the artist before being translated into matter, and, as for Plato, pure
form is indivisible in contrast to its material existence as part of matter, which is divisible
and temporal. In the Metaphysics, ‘That which is a union of form and matter can dissolve
into material parts; but that which is not bound up with matter, cannot dissolve’8. Matter
is that which springs from the Prime Unity. It is the single substance to which all bodies
can be reduced.
For Aristotle, the Idea is the combination of matter and form. Cognition, as a universal act, an act of the Universal Intelligence of which human intelligence is a part, is trans-
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formed into the form of the material object or work of art. The work of art is invested
with the Universal Intelligence, unified in the absolute, but dissolved into material parts
through individual cognitive acts, then combined in the compound whole. The cognitive
acts, the thoughts, are then identified with the material parts. From the Metaphysics, ‘The
mind thinks of itself, when it takes on the nature of an object of thought. It becomes an
object of thought through its perceiving and thinking, and then thought and object of
thought are the same’9. Matter is integrated with form, and thought is conflated with the
object of thought in its actualizing potential as a product of the diversification of the absolute, through the realization of form, as in art. Such a concept would lead to the development of disegno and the Idea in sixteenth-century Italy, where art is seen as the
manifestation of conceptualization itself through the Idea, which can be read in seventeenth-century Roman Baroque architecture. As Zuccari explains, in L’Idea de’ Pittori,
Scultori e Architetti, ‘Design is formed form, and imaged in the soul, and in the intellect;
therefore our soul and intellect should be as instruments; the senses bring objects, and
sensible forms from the intellective part of the soul, and the intellect takes the forms from
the forms, that is Design is formed from the same types, and so learns, intends, and
knows...’10.
For Aristotle, the interaction between form and matter and between appearance and
idea is paralleled by the interaction between the general concept (relating to Universal Intelligence) and the particular idea, relating to the cognitive act. From the Metaphysics, the
individual man, for example, is ‘this particular form in this particular flesh and blood’11.
The appearance in art does not imitate the Idea—instead form enters into matter. In that
the forms of art can exist in the mind of the artist beforehand, they are different from the
forms of nature, but they are like the forms of nature in the interaction of form and matter.
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle illustrates the preexistence of form in the mind with the
conception of the house by the architect and the statue by the sculptor, though the house
and statue can only preexist as form through the Idea, and not as matter.
The Neoplatonic Idea: Plotinus, Aquinas and Ficino
Plotinus, who taught philosophy in Rome from 245 to 270, separated form from matter as
well. He explains, in ‘On the Intellectual Beauty’, the Eighth Tractate of The Six Enneads,
‘The form is not in the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters the stone; and
the artificer holds it not by his equipment of eyes and hands but by his participation in his
art’12, that is, in the Idea, the conceptualization of the form. As for Plato, form is transferred from the Universal Intellect into matter, but in a contaminated state, disseminated
and no longer ideal. Beauty in art is only a derivation of beauty in the Idea or Intellect.
The form in the material cannot be compared to the form in the Idea. Art, in the conceptualization of the Universal Intellect through which the form is given, must contain
within it an idea of absolute form in the material, an internal idea which must be communicated although its material existence, its external form, falls short. Plotinus explains in
The Enneads, that the Idea or Reason Principle must contain a higher degree of beauty
and purity than anything produced as art, as an external object. The order of the universe
may be revealed through particular form, as the macrocosm is revealed through the microcosm, through the Idea, through conceptualization in form. For Plotinus, this occurs
through the intellect or principle which is found in nature. ‘Artists do not simply repro-
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duce the visible, but they go back to the principles in which nature itself had found its
origin’13. The generation of the principles of the origin of nature constitute the Idea. The
architecture of Borromini, as at San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, can be seen as a visual
and structural representation of the principles of nature as given by Neoplatonic philosophy. The architecture of Leon Battista Alberti, as at Santa Maria Novella, seeks as well to
reproduce the principles of nature in mathematical and geometric abstractions.
Then the task for Plotinus is to discover what in the principles of nature can be transferred as form in the Idea. The matter of nature alone is ugliness without an intellect, an
organizing principle, or a superimposed Idea relating the order of nature, to the human
intellect. Using the metaphor of architecture to apply the principles of nature to art, as
constructed from natural material, Plotinus asks, ‘How can the architect adjust the externally apparent house to the internal eidos of the house and insist that it is beautiful? Only
for this reason, that the external house, if the stones are imagined away, is the internal eidos, divided of course with regard to the mass of matter, but indivisible in essence, even
though appearing in multiple form’14. The work of art is the Idea, the intellection of the
internal principles of nature. Structures belonging to appearances are imitations of the
Idea, as in architecture, rather than form, as form is divisible in matter but indivisible in
the Idea. The Idea, that which is beyond sensory images in the ordering of the universe, is
continually present but inaccessible, as it is concealed in the architecture of Borromini, in
mathematical and geometrical structures underlying the formal arrangements.
For Plotinus the ordering principles of the Universal Intellect are shared by the Human Intellect in the creative Nous, an actualized form of the absolute, defined as an abstract ordering principle in the Mind and a controlling and organizing principle of matter,
thus a model of reality expressed in concrete philosophical, spatial and architectural
terms. The Nous of the human intellect is capable of formulating the Idea within itself,
while for Plato the Idea only existed outside the human intellect. Through Nous, the incorporeal and intangible thoughts of the Idea are disseminated into the spatial realm of
form and matter. In that the ordering principles are shared by the human and universal intellect, the idea of beauty is inaccessible to both sensory appearance and the organizing
principle itself: ‘The Nature, then, which creates things so lovely must be itself of a far
earlier beauty; we, undisciplined in discernment of the inward, knowing nothing of it, run
after the outer, never understanding that it is the inner which stirs us; we are in the case of
one who sees his own reflection but not realizing whence it comes goes in pursuit of
it…’15.
The idea of beauty lies beyond the apparent structure of reality, and is given as an
archetype, as in Nous. The archetype of the beauty found in material forms exists in the
Nature Principle. The archetype is given by light and primal beauty and is the creative
source of the first Reason Principle. The question, then, is how the Intellectual Principle
is represented in an image or appearance, and the answer is by non-representation, by division and dissemination. The Idea gives shape or form to matter, and thus beauty,
through Nous. In the section on Beauty, the Sixth Tractate of the Enneads, Ideal Form is
defined as unity and harmony instilled into shape.
Thomas Aquinas, who lectured in Rome from 1265 to 1267, and began the Summa
Theologica at Santa Sabina on the Aventine, formulated, in the tradition of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, a conception of the Idea, correlating idea with form, beginning with
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the separation of form and matter, and the idea of form as principle in the Universal Intellect. As he explains in Summa Theologica,
the Greek word Idea is in Latin Forma. Hence by ideas are understood the
forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form
of anything, existing apart from the thing itself, can be for one of two ends;
either to be the exemplar of that of which it is called the form, or to be the
principle of the knowledge of that thing, according as the forms of knowable things are said to be in him who knows them16.
Form is given by the inner principle, the human intellect as microcosm of the Universal Intellect. Works of art are differentiated from works of nature in that the form of
the man-made object preexists in the intellect, though in both nature and the man-made
object, the likeness of the form exists in the actuating principle, the creative Nous or the
inner principle, as in the structure of the house, from Plotinus and Aristotle, the preexistent Idea in the Nous of the architect. In all things not generated by chance, the form must
be the end of any generation whatsoever. An agent of generation does not act for the sake
of the form, but the likeness of the form is in the agent. In some agents the form of the
thing preexists according to its natural being. In other agents the form of the thing preexists according to intelligible being. Thus the likeness of a house preexists in the mind of
the architect.
For Marsilio Ficino and the Florentine Platonic Academy, the Idea entails conceptualization in the human intellect, and is no longer a metaphysical substance existing outside the world of sensory appearances or the human intellect. Art is the primary
manifestation of the Idea, despite the Platonic restrictions of form as appearance and imitation. Using the example of the architect, Ficino conceives of the process of abstraction
in artistic production. He explains in Sopra lo amore,
From the beginning the Architect conceives in his spirit the reason and approximately the Idea of the edifice; he then makes the house (according to
his ability) in the way in which he has decided in his mind. Who will deny
that the house is a body, and that it is very similar to the incorporeal Idea
of the artisan, in whose image it has been made? It must certainly be
judged for a certain incorporeal order rather than for its matter17.
The reconstruction of the image of the house or body in the imagination is given by
the inner ordering principle of the sensory images. The order or form is incorporeal, in
abstracted matter, as opposed to the matter. The order, emanating from the Universal Intellect, is preserved between the corporeal and incorporeal, and the order or form can exist without body or matter, as it is prior to it. Along with the abstraction of form and inner
sensory images comes the Neoplatonic emphasis on interior illumination in the processes
of imitation, as in the ordering of the rational principles of nature in Alberti’s concinnitas
and the establishment of canons of beauty or Bellezza. Unlike Plotinus, form is a product
of the human intellect while matter is a product of the exterior world, and res cogitans, or
things thought, are separate in their generation from res extensa, or things external,
though connected by the inner ordering principle.
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Bellezza, or sensible beauty, and the realization of the Bello, the idea of the beautiful, in artistic representation, are manifestations of the metaphysical existence of form as
well in Neoplatonic thought, given a priori in the ordering principle of the intellectual vision of form, as opposed to matter, and as opposed to generation and synthesis in the phenomenological congregation of matter. In the metaphysic of the Bello, aesthetic value,
representative of moral value, is transferred in the ordering principle, creating interior illumination and the capacity to transfer the Bello to works of art. Bello is extracted from
convinto, or conviction, but convinto is not associated with the generation of forms by Ficino, although it is by Gian Paolo Lomazzo in the Trattato dell’arte della pittura, published in 158418. Lomazzo combines the metaphysical idea of the Bello with the process
of the artistic conception in Aristotelian terms; the metaphysic of interior illumination is
combined with the interaction of matter and form in universal cognition and the making
of things.
Disegno Interno at the Accademia di San Luca
Disegno interno exists a priori of artistic execution and is combined with Christian theology by Zuccari in being the manifestation of the Universal Intellect, or a scintilla della
divinita. The Idea is implanted by God in angels without sensory perception, and then it
is transferred to human intelligence, as the aspect of Universal Intelligence in human intelligence. Works of art are meant to be thought as works of nature in resemblance and
correspondence, in embodying the same internal principles, as in Leon Battista Alberti’s
concinnitas. Following Plotinus, the forms produced or replicated from an incorruptible
substance are varied, infinite, fragmented, corrupted and disseminated, as in Borromini’s
architecture, in comparison to the pure and unified forms of the absolute, as in the lantern
of San Carlo, in the pure light from the oculus and the resolution of architectural forms.
Baroque forms contrast the intertwined and variegated corporeal forms of the terrestrial
realm in Neoplatonic hierarchies to the pure forms of the absolute, representing a passage
through the tortured labyrinth of reality. For Zuccari, forms of design can only be the result of accident:
But in forming this internal Design man is very different from God: God
has one single Design, most perfect in substance, containing all things,
which is not different from Him, because all that which is in God is God;
man, however, forms within himself various designs corresponding to the
different things he conceives. Therefore his design is an accident, and
moreover it has a lower origin, namely in the senses19.
Human designs are formed by a process which Zuccari compares to a spark, as in
the scintilla della divinita, the spark being the first concept created from the intellective
virtue, or Idea, the first manifestation, in Aristotelian terms, of the Idea in the sensory
imagination, being, as in an accident, indeterminate and confused. The spark is the transformation of the Idea, as matter and form, into cognition, retaining both matter and form,
following Aristotle.
The light from the spark is interior illumination, which lights the senses and the intellect, and is disseminated in variegated material, as in San Carlo, and sculptural ensem-
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bles such as Bernini’s Ecstasy of St. Theresa. Order is manifest in material form, being
transferred through the ordering principle of the Idea. In L’Idea de’Pittori, Scultori e Architetti:
As to form fire the stick strikes the stone, from the stone sparks escape, the
sparks light the tinder, then the wick is carried from the tinder to light the
lamp; so the intellective virtue strikes the stone of concepts in the human
mind, and the first concept, a spark ascending the tinder from the imagination, and moves phantasms, and ideal imaginations—this first concept is
indeterminate and confused, born in the faculty of the soul, or the agent of
the intellect possible and understood20.
Disegno interno is a sign of the possibility but imperfection of human knowledge.
Nature achieves order through an intellective principle, formulated through the projection
of human logic and reason onto the mute forms of nature. Art imitates nature in so far as
it enacts human reason, of which the forms of nature are representative:
And if we wish to know why Nature can be imitated, it is because Nature
is guided toward its own goal and toward its own procedures by an intellective principle. Therefore her work is the work of unerring intelligence,
as the philosophers say; for she reaches her goal by orderly and infallible
means. And since art, chiefly with the aid of the above-mentioned design,
observes precisely the same in its procedure, therefore Nature can be imitated by art, and art is able to imitate Nature21.
Because the forms of nature are combinations of form and matter, art is capable of
forming itself from the Idea or intellect. Through the agent of the mind of the artist, artistic forms arise as natural forms, forms being transformed into matter, accidental and discernible, revealing in the indeterminateness and confusion of sensory experience the clear
order of the intellective principle. The multiple and variable forms of the material world
emanate from the unity of the absolute as the multiple forms of Baroque architecture in
the worship space of the church emanate from the unified and resolved source of light in
the lantern. Multiplicity and variability are the result of the limitations of the human intellect. Following Aristotle, disegno interno is a process of actualization, and intellect is an
operating instrument. Disegno involves the phantasm, formed concept and object of sensation, a mental representation of a real object, a product of the imagination, a manifestation and reflection of form according to the intellective principle. ‘Design is form,
concept, idea, and light of the intellect, and in its potential of intention and understanding,
its first intellections…are not without phantasms; phantasms, say the philosophers, are
sensible things, ideally formed concepts’22. Disegno also entails dreams, which serve to
form, in the internal sense of the imagination, prototypes for representations of form in
images, through cognition and judgment. ‘Imagination is formed by common sense in
cognition, judgment, and the division of types, composed together as we experiment in
dreams, having seen [objects of perception] represented in dreams’23.
For Zuccari, ‘whenever our intellect forms within itself some Universal Design, at
the same time the two internal senses [cognition and imagination] form together their
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own particular design’24. The disegno esterno of sensory experience is the particular correlation to the universal disegno interno of abstraction and intellection in the Idea, the
particularity in matter as defined temporally of universal form. The formation of particulars in disegno esterno, and the identification of physical types, as in dreams, is a scientific process: ‘Our intellect has in this way begun to intend something, and from that
[process] science is acquired, and after being placed in it some type is acquired, and science itself, also forms in itself various representative designs of this particular first
known through the senses’25. Zuccari explains that the intellect first knows the nature of
material things given by the internal principle, then it knows the types in which the nature
is reflected, then it knows the singular forms caused by the types. The forms are known
by the two internal concepts, sensed and unsensed, particular and universal, formed from
imagination and cognition26, and become a particular design representing the singulars of
the particular nature.
Design is the means by which the Idea in the intellect becomes the external form of
the artistic production. Design is ‘both intellective and practical, corresponding to two intellects in us, the speculative one for universal purposes, and the practical one for the
purposes of our operations’27, as described in the transcripts of Romano Alberti. Both
types of design are necessary, ‘as one is objective and has known limits in practical and
particular things and the other represents things which are universally understood in the
intellect. Thus there is an intellective design and a practical design’28. Design as a whole
is the ‘expression and declaration of a concept, which is first in the mind’29. Disegno interno fabricates the Idea, while disegno esterno fabricates the exterior visual experience.
Disegno esterno is ‘defined in visual form. It is the form of all exemplary forms of all
things which we can imagine and form’30.
External design ‘is a form of science, a faculty for determining the proportions of
quantity in visible things31, a faculty assigned by Marsilio Ficino to the mechanism of vision in Theologia Platonica. But external design is also ‘a definition of our intelligence,
reflecting the intellect in a clear mirror, making visible the things represented in the intellect, through intelligible forms, reasoned in metaphor and similitude 32 . Artistic forms
come about through the process of design in the use of literary tropes from Aristotle’s
Rhetoric, including metaphor and similitude. Meaning in the visual arts is given by language, as visual forms are the manifestation of ideas.
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Federico Zuccari, L’Idea de’ Pittori, Scultori e Architetti, Torino, 1607, in Detlef Heikamp, ed., Scritti d’Arte di Federico Zuccaro (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1941), p.
95.
2
Translated in Erwin Panofsky, Idea, A Concept in Art Theory (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1968), p. 85.
3
Ibid., p. 86.
4
Zuccari, L’Idea, p. 95: ‘Il dissegno considerato particolarmente, in quanto che è parte, è
fondamento della Pittura, Scultura e Architettura e imitatione d’un idolo che consiste nelle proportioni di quantita continua, perfettamente disposte, e determinate, formato dall’
istess’ Artefice. Questo Dissegno nell’istesso modo considerato, si puo deserivere per
metafora, che sia luce dell’intelletto, e vita dell’operationi, o vero realmente che sia faculta di determinare perfettamente le proportioni di quantita, nelle cose visibili. Considerando il Dissegno universalmente, in quanto che alla fabricatione d’ogni Idea intellettuale, si
può quel nome applicare...cioè che sia lume generali dell’intelletto; Primo motore
dell’intelligentie; forma de tutte le forme; Alimento delle pratiche; un’altro Nume, o Natura generante, che aviva, opera, e da spirito a tutte l’intelligentie humane’.
5
Trans. in Panofsky, Idea, A Concept in Art Theory, p. 11.
6
Ibid., p. 3.
7
Translated in Aristotle, Metaphysics, Louise Loomis, ed. (New York: Walter Black,
1943), p. 29.
8
Trans. in Panofsky, Idea, p. 27.
9
Trans. in Aristotle, Metaphysics, p. 35.
10
Zuccari, L’Idea de’ Pittori, Scultori e Architetti, p. 37: ‘Il Disegno è forma formata, e
imaginata nell’anima, e nell’intelletto, e pero vuole che l’anima nostra, e l’intelletto sia
nel sudetto modo quasi un’istessa cosa e come mano che piglia la forma delle forme, cioè
il Disegno formato dall’istessa specie, e cosi apprende, intende, e conosce.…’
11
Trans. in Panofsky, Idea, p. 17.
12
Trans. in Plotinus, The Six Enneads (Chicago: Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc., 1952), p.
239.
13
Trans. in Panofsky, Idea, p. 26.
14
Ibid., p. 28.
15
Trans. in Plotinus, The Six Enneads, p. 240.
16
Trans. in Anton Pegis, ed., The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York:
Random House, 1945), p. 162.
17
Marsilio Ficino, Sopra lo amore o ver convito di Platone (Florence, 1544), Or. V, Ch.
3–6, pp. 94ff in Opera latina, II, 1336ff (trans. in Panofsky, Idea, p. 137).
18
See Edmondo Cione, ‘Presentazione del Traduttore’, in Panofsky, Idea, p. xv.
19
Zuccari, L’Idea, I, 7, p. 50, trans. in Panofsky, Idea, p. 88.
20
Zuccari, L’Idea, p. 25: ‘Pero dico, che si come per formare il fuoco il focile batte la
pietra, dalle Pietra n’escon faville, le faville accendon l’esca; poi appressandosi all’esca i
sosarelli s’accende la lucerna; Cosi la virtu intelletiva batte la pietra de i concetti nella
mente humana; e il primo concetto, che svavilla accende l’esca dell’imaginatione, e move
i fantasmi, e imaginationi ideali, il qual primo concetto è indeterminato, e confuso, ne
dalla facolta dell’anima, o intelletto agente possibile e inteso’.
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Ibid., p. 21: ‘La ragione poi, perche l’arte imiti la Natura è; perche il Disegno interno
artificiale, e l’arte istessa si muovono ad operare nella spedutione delle cose artificiali al
modo, che opera a Natura istessa. E se vogliamo anco sapere perche la Natura sia imitabile, e perche la Natura è ordinata da un principio intelletivo al suo proprio fine, e alle sue
operationi; onde l’opera sua è opera dell’intelligenza non errante, come dicono i Filosofi’.
22
Ibid., p. 37: ‘Dunque il Disegno è forma, è concetto, è Idea, è luce all’intelletto, e alle
potenze sue all’intendere, e al capire, e le prime intellettioni non sono fantasmati, ma non
sono senza fantasmati; perioche i fantasmati, come il Filosofo vuole, sono cose sensibil,
concetti formati Ideali’.
23
Ibid., p. 26: ‘Il secondo senso interno si chiama fantasia, è formate dal senso commune
nella cognitione, giuditio, e coparatione di quelle specie, riceve in se stesso, e in oltre
queste insieme compone, come noi esperimentiamo ne i sogni, ch’ havendo veduto’.
24
Ibid., p. 31: ‘che mai l’intelletto nostro forma entro di se qualche Disegno universale,
se anco prima, o insieme questi due sensi interni non formano i proprii Disegni particolari’.
25
Ibid., p. 32: ‘L’intelletto nostro ha in questo modo cominciato ad intendere qualche cosa, e di lei acquistata la scienza, o pure doppo posto in esso qualche specie acquistare, e la
scienza istessa, forma anco in se stesso varii Disegni rappresentanti quel particolare conosciuto per il senso’.
26
Ibid.: ‘In prima egli dirittamente conosce solo la natura commune delle cose, e poi indirrittamente, e quasi reflettendosi sopra di se medesimo, considerando, e la specie, con la
quale primo conobbe, e l’operatione con la quale conobbe, conosce anco il singolare dal
quale detta specie in qualche modo fu cagionata; Cosi non potendo lui in alcun modo, o
compitamente, o incopitamente intendere senza Disegno, forma anche di quel singolare
un Disegno interno in se stesso. Si che intendono noi qual si voglia cosa; prima la fantasia,
e la cognitione dei singolari di quella formano due concetti, uno sensato; e l’altro insensato, poi l’intelletto dirittamente intendono, forma il Disegno interno commune rappresentante quella cosa in generale, quanto alla natura comune, in ultimo indirittamente
discorrendo, ne forma un’altro Disegno particolare rappresentando i singolari di quella
natura’.
27
Romano Alberti, Origine e Progresso dell’Academia del Disegno (Pavia: Pietro Bartoli,
1604), p. 19: ‘Si deve pero sapere che non d’una, ma di due forti, è il disegno, cioè intellettivo, e prattico, poiche si come sono duoi intelletti in noi uno chiamato speculativo, il
cui fine proprio è l’intendere solamente in universale, e l’altro adimandato intelletto pratico, il cui termine proprio, e ultimo è l’operare, o per dire meglio esser principio
dell’operationi nostre…’.
28
Ibid.: ‘è necessario che anco siano due i disegni alluminanti gl’intelletti nostri, cioè uno
che è oggetto, e termino dell’intelletto cognoscitivo, e questo rappresenta all’intelletto le
cose universalmente intese, e l’altro che è oggetto e termino dell’intelletto prattico, e questo rappresenta all’intelletto le cose in particolare, e in singolare’.
29
Ibid., p. 18: ‘Il disegno è una apparente espressione e dichiaratione del cocetto, che era
prima nell’animo…’.
30
Ibid., p. 19: ‘che cosa sia il disegno esterno, in forma sua visiva...hora il pratico dico
essere forma di tutte le forme essemplare di tutte le cose, ch’immaginare, e formare si
possono…’.
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31

Ibid, p. 18 ‘la forma della scienza...che dice il disegno essere una facoltà di terminare
perfettamente le proportioni di quantità nelle cose visibile…’.
32
Ibid.: ‘è insieme un termine della nostra intelligenza, in cui come in lucidissimo specchio l’intelletto chiaramente, e espressamente vede le cose rapresentate in lui, per le forme intelligibili ornanti l’istesso intelletto, o ragionando in metafora, e similitudine lo
difiniremo…’.

